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The effect of information disclosure on information asymmetry 
Abstract 
This study investigates the relation among information disclosure, firm characteristics and information asymmetry. The 
authors find evidence consistent with the notion that increasing corporate disclosure and transparency reduces the 
asymmetric information between informed and uninformed investors. The findings indicate a strong relation between 
firm characteristics and level of information disclosure. Larger firms, firms with high growth opportunity and superior 
performance are associated with higher level of information disclosure. With respect to type of information, large 
firms, firms with superior operating performance, high growth opportunity are likely to disclose the investment and 
structural change as well as legal and miscellaneous information. Furthermore, the empirical findings indicate that 
listed companies with high corporate transparency and disclosure have low relative bid-ask spreads and high share 
turnover. Conclusively, the evidence supports the notion that increasing corporate disclosure and transparency reduce 
the asymmetric information between informed and uninformed traders. 
Keywords: information disclosure, firm characteristics, disclosure policy. 
JEL Classification: G11, G14, G24. 
Introduction 
In the past twenty years, there has been increased 
attention and focus on the importance of 
information disclosure. In the model of capital 
market equilibrium with incomplete information, 
Merton (1987) demonstrates the extent to which 
corporate disclosure affects firm value. Unlike 
traditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
incomplete information environment leads to market 
segmentation and prevent investors from obtaining 
the complete information necessary for portfolio 
diversification. Consequently, investors perceive 
securities with low information disclosure as riskier 
securities and demand higher rate of return from 
their investments (Klein and Bawa, 1977; Bawa, 
Brown and Klein, 1979; and Barry and Brown, 
1984, 1985 and 1986).  
On the other hand, information disclosure can 
drastically increase firm value. Healy and Palepu 
(2001), Leftwich (1980), Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986), and Beaver (1998) argue that minimum 
disclosure requirements could diminish information 
gap between informed and uninformed investors 
since corporate disclosure provides new and 
relevant information to outside investors. Bhardwaj 
and Brooks (1992), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and 
Cheng, Courtenay and Krishnamurti (2005) show 
that high degree of information disclosure reduce 
information asymmetry between outside investors 
and managers which results in lower monitoring 
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cost. Similarly, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), 
Kim and Verrecchia (1994), Botosan (1997), 
Piotroski (1999) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) 
show theoretically or empirically that the high 
information disclosure firm is associated with lower 
cost of capital. 
This study investigates the relationship between 
information disclosure and firm characteristics. Our 
findings indicate a strong relation between firm 
characteristics and level of information disclosure. 
Larger firms, firms with high growth opportunity 
and superior operating performance are associated 
with higher level of information disclosure. With 
respect to type of information, large firms, firms 
with high market-to-book ratios and high revenue 
growth are likely to disclose the investment and 
structural change as well as legal and miscellaneous 
information. Firms having low ownership 
concentration frequently release investment and 
structural change information. Firms with high 
leverage tend to regularly disclose financial 
information. Furthermore, this study analyzes 
whether firm’ policies of increasing the corporate 
disclosure and transparency can reduce information 
asymmetry among insiders and outside investors. 
The empirical results demonstrate that listed 
companies in Thailand with high corporate 
transparency and disclosure, particularly in 
investment and structural change as well as legal 
and miscellaneous information have low relative 
bid-ask spreads and high share turnover. 
Endogeneity is addressed through the use of 2-Stage 
Least Squares estimation. Conclusively, the 
evidence supports the notion that increasing 
corporate disclosure and transparency can reduce 
the asymmetric information between informed and 
uninformed traders. 
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows. 
Section 1 describes information disclosure procedure 
and dissemination policy on Stock Exchange of 
Thailand. Sections 2 and 3 describe data descriptions 
and methodology, respectively. Section 4 reports the 
empirical results and discussion of findings. The final 
section concludes the paper. 
1. Information disclosure procedure and 
dissemination policy 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) maintains a 
policy requiring companies to disclose market 
moving information. Listed securities are mandatory 
to disclose adequate information of material 
incidents or development in their business activities 
to the public. According to the Security and 
Exchange Act A.D. (1992), the obligation of 
corporate information disclosure is contained in 
Division 5 with the section 56 and 57. These 
requirements display the mechanism of capital 
market to govern the listed company performance 
and to preserve impartiality of market participants 
and exchange. Thus, listed company has a 
mandatory condition to disclose the necessary 
information to the general public. The Stock 
Exchange of Thailand recognizes that the significant 
of corporate disclosure should be correct, sufficient 
and timely. SET, hence, has initiated the appropriate 
guidelines on disclosure of listed companies to 
ensure that all investors can equally and timely 
access to corporate information. A listed company is 
required to disclose the significant information relating 
to the business affairs and its subsidiaries under market 
conditions. SET defined the important information 
disclosure as follows: 
i Where the information is likely to have a 
significant effect on trading of any of the 
company’s securities. 
i Where such information is likely to be 
considered important by an investor, who 
applies analysis of information by analysts or 
experts in determining his choices of action. 
i Where such information is likely to have the 
effect on the investors or shareholders. 
Listed companies are required to disclose the 
material information concerning its business 
through SET. The listed company must disclose any 
information either before or after the end of a trading 
session. Disclosing during a trading session, the listing 
department post a trading halt on securities or await 
the disclosure until the appropriate time. Figure 1 
exhibits the dissemination procedure of essential 
information.  
Fig. 1. Dissemination and procedure of information disclosure 
To ensure equal access, any listed companies must 
disclose the material information at least one hour 
prior to the commencement of each trading session 
or after the close of the day’s trading. Therefore, 
investors have enough time to analyze the 
information in order to make investment decisions 
(Figure 2). The Stock Exchange of Thailand has two 
daily trading sessions. The morning trading session 
is from 10:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and the afternoon 
trading session is from 2:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
However, if it’s deemed that the listed companies 
disclose information during the trading session, SET 
may order a temporary prohibition trading of its 
securities by posting the Trading Halts (H) or 
Suspension (SP) sign on its securities.  
2. Data description  
The data used in this study was obtained from the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)’s database. The 
database provides historical and real-time 
information of listed firms through SETINFO. We 
use time-stamped news announcements file, daily 
trading information of listed firms, and firm-specific 
characteristics at the fiscal year end. We measure 
daily news announcement by frequency of news, 
and classify the news into category by the headline 
of news announcement.  
Table 1 presents sample selection process of news 
announcements. There are total of 84,204 news 
announcements during the period of 1999-2007. 
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While listed firms in Thailand are traded on two 
main exchanges, SET and MAI (Market for 
Alternative Investment), our study focuses on the 
largest exchange (SET). We only include common 
stocks in our analyses and exclude unit trust 
securities because of a lack of liquidity for these 
securities. Lastly, we exclude duplicated new 
announcements for the same company with the 
same news content and released dates. Our final 
sample consists of 68,722 news announcements 
from 300 non-financial firms. 
Table 1. Summary of sample selection of news 
announcements 
Total news announcements 84,204 
Less: 
Listed security on Market for Alternative Investment 615 
Unit trust security 14,867 
Duplicated news announcements 12,155 
Final sample news announcements 68,722 
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of news 
announcement of listed companies on the SET. The three types 
of news disclosure categories are identified by the SET 
Regulation & Notification and Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 
(1992). The first category of news announcement is Corporate 
Investment and Structural Change announcement (INV_STRUC).
The second and third of news type are Financial Information 
announcement (FIN_INFO) and Legal and Miscellaneous 
announcement (LEG_MIS), respectively.  
3. Methodology 
3.1. News announcement classification. We classify 
news announcements into three groups based on the 
SET’s disclosure regulation: Corporate Investment and 
Structural Change: (INV_STRUC), Financial 
Information (FIN_INFO) and Legal and Miscella-
neous (LEG_MIS).
Corporate Investment and Structural Change 
(INV_STRUC):
i Change in asset. The purchase or sale of asset, 
change in investment plan, project, product or 
capital expenditure, acquisition or loss a contact. 
i Change in equity or ownership. The purchase or 
sale of securities, change in management control 
(i.e. joint venture, merger, acquisition, conso-
lidation and tender offer), change in capital, 
equity or ownership of firm.  
i Increased/decreased capital. The issuance of an 
amount of news shares for sale to public or any 
persons or the cancellation or maturity of 
securities of listed company in whole or in part.  
i Debt financing. Taking a loan or issuing debt 
instruments in an amount significant to its 
financial position & performance. 
i Restructuring. Announce the financing or 
restructuring plans, business rehabilitation, 
reorganization or reconstruction. 
i Repurchase. Buying back the shares of the listed 
companies or disposing of the shares that have 
been bought back. 
i Stock split. A change in a share’s per value. 
i Stock option. The issuance of right in financial 
instruments to the public such as warrants, 
employee stock option (ESOP), convertible 
bond/equity, right offering. 
Financial Information (FIN_INFO): 
i Earnings. The actual disclosure of financial 
statement, annual report and the performance 
report of listed companies via the earnings 
forecasted by listed companies or analysts. 
i Dividend. The declaration or omission of 
dividend. 
Legal and Miscellaneous (LEG_MIS):
i Regulatory or legal decisions. Posting or lifting 
the trading sign which is issued by SET to warn 
investors when listed companies fail to follow 
the rule and obligation of SET i.e. the firm delay 
or do not send the financial statement to SET 
with in the required period. 
i Personnel announcement. A change in authority of 
control or management in the listed companies 
i Miscellaneous. An ordinary/extraordinary general 
meeting or other date for conferring, closing the 
firm share register, listed securities granted by 
SET and others that do not matched with other 
announcements. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics 
of total sample as well as each category of news 
announcement. There are 68,722 news announce-
ments in total. Financial Information (FIN_INFO)
frequently announces the information than other 
categories (34,498 observations). The frequency of 
Legal and Miscellaneous (LEG_MIS) information 
and Corporate Investment and Structural Change 
(INV_STRUC) announcements are 22,097 (82.8%) 
and 12,127 (45.31%) observations, respectively. 
Table 2, Panel B, presents the summary statistics of 
news announcement by industry. Conditional on a 
firm having made at least one disclosure in the 
relevant category, firms in Service (SERVICE) 
industry is more frequently announced the news 
(15,644 announcements or 22.76% from total). The 
mean number of FIN_INFO announcements is the 
highest in the consumption industry, with an 
average of 125.5 announcements per firm. The 
mean number of INV_STRUC and LEG_MIS
announcements is highest in the technology and 
resource industry, with an average of 65.87 and 
97.08 announcements per firm. 
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Table 2. The descriptive statistics of news announcements 
Type of news announcement 
Corporate Investment & Structure Change (INV_STRUC)
Financial Information Legal & Miscellaneous 
Total (%) (FIN_INFO) (LEG_MIS)
Mean No. of ann. (%) Mean 
No. of 
ann. (%) Mean 
No. of 
ann. (%) 
Panel A: All sample 
Total sample 45.31 12,127 18 122 34,498 50 83 22,097 32 68,722 
Panel B: Grouped by industry  
AGRO  25 1,185 10 115 5,392 16 61 2,884 13 9,461 14 
CONSUMP  19 655 5 126 4,518 13 63 2,276 10 7,449 11 
INDUS  26 1,086 9 121 5,212 15 69 2,968 13 9,266 13 
PROPCON  57 3,512 29 107 6,646 19 80 4,933 22 15,091 22 
RESOURC  59 766 6 106 1,375 4 97 1,262 6 3,403 5 
SERVICE  43 2,947 24 113 7,821 23 71 4,876 22 15,644 23 
TECH 66 1,976 16 118 3,534 10 97 2,898 13 8,408 12 
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of news announcement of listed companies on the SET. The three types of news 
disclosure categories are identified by the SET Regulation & Notification and Securities and Exchange Act B.E. (1992). The first
category of news announcement is Corporate Investment and Structural Change announcement (INV_STRUC). The second and the 
third of news type are Financial Information announcement (FIN_INFO) and Legal and Miscellaneous announcement (LEG_MIS),
respectively. This table illustrates the mean of news announcement, total number and percentage of each category of news 
announcement grouped by industry.  
3.2. Ordinary least squares regressions. We employ 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to examine 
the relationship between firm characteristics intensity 
of news announcement. The firm-specific character-
ristics are firm size (MVALUE), firm performance 
(TobinQ), financial leverage (LEV), firm growth 
(GROWTH), firm age (AGE), ownership concentration 
(OWN), industry classification (D_Industry), year 
classification (D_Year). The specific measures are 
defined in the caption for Table 3. 
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3.3. Two-stage least square estimation. We 
employ two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions to 
examine how the intensity of each category of news 
announcement affects the degree of information 
asymmetry. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Lang 
and Lunholm (1993) Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
and Cheng, Courtenay and Krishnamurti (2005) 
suggest that firms’ policies to increase disclosure 
can decrease information asymmetry. 
To explore the effect of intensity of each category of 
news announcement on the information asymmetry, 
we extend Leuz and Verrecchia’s (2000) model and 
measure the degree of information asymmetry 
using bid-ask spreads, trading volume and price 
volatility1. However, as Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
and Cheng, Courtenay and Krishnamurti (2005) 
point out, an increase in information disclosure may 
have endogenous effect on all three proxies of 
information asymmetry. Therefore, this study uses 
2SLS procedure to reduce simultaneity bias. This 
procedure can be applied to estimate the equation 
that is likely to suffer endogeneity problem by 
replacing the endogenous variables with their 
instrumental variables. In 2SLS method, we first 
                                                     
1 Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2009) and Clarke and Shastri (2000) 
examine the alternative proxies of information asymmetry based on market 
microstructure theory such as adverse selection component of bid and ask 
spread. We choose to adopt firm characteristic proxy in this study. 
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estimate (2), (3) and (4) in the first stage and use 
new variable as instrumental variable. An 
instrumental variable is an excellent proxy for the 
endogenous variable and is independent of the error 
term (Studenmund, 2001). The instrumental variable 
in simultaneous equation can avoid the relation 
between the error terms and endogenous variables.  
The market movement variables, RESPREAD,
SHTURNOVER and VOLATILTY, are specified as 
endogenous variables. As the exogenous variables, 
we define other explanatory variables in market 
activity model in equation (5), (6) and (7) as 
exogenous variables and used them as instrumental 
variables in simultaneous equation. For instance, the 
intensity of news announcement, specifically 
INV_STRUC, FIN_INFO and LEG_MIS, firm size 
(TA), firm’s ownership concentration (OWN), firm 
leverage (LEV), firm performance (TobinQ), firm 
growth (GROWTH), share price (PRICE) and 
dummy variables of year and industry. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Univariate analysis. Table 3 presents the 
summary statistics of firm characteristics and 
market trading reaction used to be a proxy of 
information asymmetry during 1995 to 2007. The table 
describes the statistics of mean, standard deviation, 
minimum value and maximum value, respectively. 
The sample data comprises of 2193 observations from 
non-financial firms on SET. The daily average of 
relative bid-ask spread (RESPREAD), share turnover 
(SHTURNOVER) and price volatility (VOLA-
TILITY%) are 0.2, 0.3 and 8.4, respectively.  
To illustrate the summary statistics of firm 
characteristics, the mean of the firm leverage (LEV)
measuring by debt ratio has the proportion as 0.48. 
The values of performance (TobinQ) of listed 
companies are average as 1.14. Sukcharoensin (2003) 
illustrates that Tobin’s Q ratio above one indicates that 
the market views the firm’s internal organization as 
exceptionally good or the expected agency costs as 
particularly small. The book value of sale growth 
(GROWTH) approximates as 10.97 in average. In 
generally, the percentages of outstanding shares owned 
by top ten shareholders (OWN) are 70.12, ranging 
from a high of 191.28% to a low of 2.98%. Firms in 
the sample have an AGE of 23.23 years. To measure 
the size of firms, it is measured by the book value of 
total assets (TA) and the market value of equity 
(MVALUE). The TA and MVALUE have average value 
as 6914.64 million Baht and 2581.89 million Baht, 
respectively. Finally, the average of security price 
traded on SET is 36.34 Baht.  
In addition, this study utilizes univariate analysis to 
investigate the interrelation between the intensity of 
news announcement, firm characteristics and market 
trading movement. Nonetheless, the variables used 
to examine in this paper are derived after testing for 
normal distribution plot of each variable. This 
research also finds that TA, MVALUE, RESPREAD,
SHTURNOVER and VOLATILITY are not normally 
distributed. Therefore, to make the data conform to 
normal distribution, TA, MVALUE, RESPREAD,
SHTURNOVER and VOLATILITY are transformed by 
logarithm function into Ln(TA), Ln(MVALUE), 
Ln(RESPREAD), Ln(SHTURNOVER) and Ln(VOLA-
TILITY), respectively. 
Table 3. Summary statistic of firm characteristics and market reaction 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Maximum Minimum 
Market activity variables 
RESPREAD 0.20 0.33 2.00 0.01 
SHTURNOVER 0.30 0.63 9.18 0.00 
VOLATILITY 8.40 53.48 1875.00 0.00 
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Table 3 (cont.). Summary statistic of firm characteristics and market reaction 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Maximum Minimum 
Firm characteristics variables 
LEV 0.48 0.26 2.03 0.00 
TobinQ 1.14 0.73 10.55 0.13 
GROWTH 10.97 175.91 3569.00 -5939.00 
OWN 70.12 16.80 191.28 2.98 
AGE 23.23 14.86 121.00 1.00 
TA (million Baht) 6914.64 17380.78 269067.17 201.76 
MVALUE (million Baht) 2581.90 6232.09 121799.00 0.00 
PRICE (Baht) 36.34 70.26 1382.00 0.04 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics of firm characteristics and market trading reaction. RESPREAD is the relative bid-ask 
spread defined as [(Ask Price – Bid Price)/ [(Ask price + Bid Price)/2]]. SHTURNOVER is the average daily of share turnover 
calculated from the proportion of traded shares to outstanding shares. VOLATILITY (%) is computed as the standard deviation of 
daily security return. As the firm characteristics variables, LEV is calculated as the book value of total liability divided by the book 
value of total asset at the end of fiscal year. TobinQ is defined as [(market value of outstanding equity + the book value of total 
liability) / the book value of total asset]. GROWTH is the percentage change of annual sales. AGE is the duration of firms since they 
have been established. OWN is defined as percentage of outstanding shares owned by top ten largest shareholders. TA and 
MAVALUE are calculated as the book value of total assets and market value of common stock at the end of fiscal year. Finally, 
PRICE is the average daily share price. 
4.2. Multivariate analysis results: OLS analysis 
on intensity of news announcement. Table 4 
presents the coefficient estimates from Model (1). 
First, the coefficient estimate for firm size 
(MVALUE) and firm performance (TobinQ) are 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting a 
strong relationship between firm size, firm 
performance and disclosure. Second, the coefficient 
estimate for firm leverage (LEV) is positive and 
statistically significant, indicating that firms with 
high financial leverage provide more information 
than the low leverage firms. Third, the positive 
relation between GROWTH and firm disclosure 
implies the high growth firms disclose more 
information than the low growth firms consistent 
with the findings of Lang, Lin and Miller (2003). 
The inverse relationships between OWN and firm 
disclosure suggest that the high ownership 
concentration firms disclose less corporate 
information and are less transparency than the low 
ownership concentration firms. This finding is 
consistent with Cheng, Courtenay and Krishnamurti 
(2005) illustrating that firms with high ownership 
concentration disclose more information to diminish 
the agency cost of firms.  
4.3. Multivariate analysis results: intensity of 
each category of new announcement. Table 5 
presents the coefficient estimates from (Model (2), (3) 
and (4)). The coefficient estimates for INV_STRUC
regression (Model (2) indicate positive relationship 
between intensity of Investment and Structural Change 
announcement and firm size (TA), high growth firms 
(MVALUE) and high performance firms (TobinQ) but 
no statistically significant relationship to firm leverage 
(LEV) and firm age (AGE). Furthermore, the firms that 
frequently announce this type of news have low 
ownership concentration. Most of the dummy 
variables of year and industry are significant, 
indicating that year and industry differences influence 
the news disclosure.  
Table 4. Regression results of the effect of news 
announcement on firm-specific characteristics 
Firm characteristics 
NUM_NEWS
Coefficient estimates P-value
Constant -26.0380*** 0.000
LEV 3.3690*** 0.002
TobinQ 2.9987*** 0.000
GROWTH 0.0040*** 0.003
AGE 0.0044 0.836
OWN -0.0313* 0.058
Ln(TA) 6.6290*** 0.000
Ln(MVALUE) 0.9572*** 0.000
Adj. R2 0.379996 
Notes: This table presents regression results from the ordinary 
least square regression. NUM_NEWS is the frequency of total 
news announcement. LEV is calculated as the book value of 
total liability divided by the book value of total asset at the end 
of fiscal year. TobinQ is defined as [(market value of 
outstanding equity + the book value of total liability) / the book 
value of total asset]. GROWTH is the percentage change of 
annual sales. AGE is the duration of firms since they have been 
established. OWN is defined as percentage of outstanding shares 
owned by top ten largest shareholders. Ln(TA) and 
Ln(MAVALUE) are the logarithm of book value of total assets 
and logarithm of market value of common stock at the end of 
fiscal year. The differences of year and industry effect are not 
reported in this table. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
The second regression (Model (3)) presents the 
relationship between the intensity of Financial 
Information announcement (FIN_INFO) and firm 
characteristics. The results suggest that firms with 
high disclosure in financial information category are 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Issue 1, 2013 
231
larger firms and have more financial leverage than the 
low disclosure firms in these types of disclosure. 
Specifically, only LEV, Ln(TA) and Ln(MVALUE)
have positive and statistically significant relation with 
FIN_INFO announcement. The last regression 
(Model (4)) presents the relationship between the 
intensity of Legal and Miscellaneous announcement 
(LEG_MIS) and firm characteristics. The coefficient 
estimates of TobinQ, GROWTH, Ln(TA) and 
Ln(MVALUE), LEV are positively and statistically 
significantly, suggesting that firms frequently 
disclose the Legal and Miscellaneous information 
are large firms, highly leverage form, firms with 
superior performance and growth opportunity. Most 
of year and industry dummy variables have 
significant effect on LEG_MIS information. 
Overall, our findings suggest that the type of news 
announcement is significantly correlated with firm-
specific characteristics. In particular, larger firms, 
firms with higher growth opportunity and superior 
operating performance tend to disclose Investment 
Structural Change information and Legal and 
Miscellaneous information more frequently.  
Table 5. Regression results of the effect of news announcement on  
firm-specific characteristics by news type 
Firm characteristics 
INV_STRUC FIN_INFO LEG_MIS
Coefficient estimates P-value Coefficient estimates P-value Coefficient estimates P-value
Constant -19.3429*** 0.000 2.6685* 0.089 -9.3636*** 0.000
LEV 0.8529 0.192 1.4721*** 0.001 1.0438** 0.038
TobinQ 1.7657*** 0.000 0.1429 0.253 1.0901*** 0.000
GROWTH 0.0013* 0.071 0.0006 0.174 0.0020*** 0.000
AGE 0.0013 0.915 0.0016 0.823 0.0014*** 0.896
OWN -0.0384*** 0.000 -0.0012 0.805 0.0083 0.298
Ln(TA) 2.7100*** 0.000 1.1286*** 0.000 2.7905*** 0.000
Ln(MVALUE) 0.5256*** 0.000 0.0988** 0.029 0.3328*** 0.000
Adj. R2 0.258119 0.260035 0.399321 
Notes: This table presents regression results from the ordinary least square regression. INV_STURC is the intensity of Investment 
and Structural Change announcement category. FIN_INFO is the intensity of Financial Information announcement categories. 
LEG_MIS is the intensity of Legal and Miscellaneous announcement category. LEV is calculated as the book value of total liability 
divided by the book value of total asset at the end of fiscal year. TobinQ is defined as [(market value of outstanding equity + the 
book value of total liability) / the book value of total asset]. GROWTH is the percentage change of annual sales. AGE is the duration 
of firms since they have been established. OWN is defined as percentage of outstanding shares owned by top ten largest 
shareholders. Ln(TA) and Ln(MAVALUE) are the logarithm of book value of total assets and logarithm of market value of common 
stock at the end of fiscal year. The differences of year and industry effect are not report in this table. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
4.4. 2SLS estimation on bid-ask spread, share 
turnover and price volatility. We use 2SLS 
regressions to estimate the consequences of 
increasing news announcement on market trading 
reaction proxy for information asymmetry as shown in 
equation (5), (6) and (7). Before examining the impact 
of level of news announcement in each category on 
market reaction, we investigate the overall level of 
news announcement, (NUM_NEWS), the effect on 
market reaction through bid-ask spread, share turnover 
and price volatility. 
Panel A of Table 6 (see Appendix) presents the 
effect of intensity of news announcement on the 
market trading reaction. The results indicate that 
NUM_NEWS is significantly and negatively correlated 
with RESPREAD at the 1% level. On the contrary, 
NUM_NEWS is significantly and positively inter-
related with SHTURNOVER and VOLATILITY at 1% 
the level. RESPREAD, SHTUR-NOVER and VOLA-
TILITY are described by the explanatory variables in 
the regression model at 43.43%, 21.53% and 
34.19%, respectively. The results of 2SLS estimation 
show that the overall F-statistic in RESPREAD,
SHTURNOVER and VOLATILITY models are 
significant at the 1% level which suggests that firms’ 
policies to increase the intensity of news announ-
cement can diminish the information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed traders. These 
results are consistent with numerous studies such as 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Lang and Lunholm 
(1993), Botosan (1997), Leuz and Verrecchia (2002) 
and Cheng, Courtenay and Krishnamurti (2005). 
The first 2SLS regression in Table 6, Panel B, 
presents the result of intensity of each category of 
news announcement on relative bid-ask spreads 
Ln(RESPREAD) (Model (5)). The overall F-test in 
this regression model is significant at the 1% level. 
The relative bid-ask spread model is highly 
significant and described at 37.99% by explanatory 
variables. The intensity of INV_STRUC and 
LEG_MIS announcement is negatively correlated 
with Ln(RESPREAD) at the 1% and 10% levels. 
The firm size, share turnover have negative 
interrelation at the 1% level while price volatility 
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and firms’ ownership concentration are positively 
related to Ln(RESPREAD). Moreover, the marginal 
effects of year and industry dummy variables are 
significant. This result implies that firms with high 
disclosure of the INV_STRUC and LEG_MIS
information can reduce the securities’ relative bid-ask 
spread. In other words, increasing INV_STRUC and 
LEG_MIS information can diminish information 
asymmetry.  
The second 2SLS regression reports the result of 
intensity of each category of news announcement on 
share turnover model (Model (6)). The 2SLS 
estimation model is significant at 1% level as shown 
by F-statistics. Adjusted R2 indicating the percent-
tage of total variation of dependent variable 
(Ln(SHTURNOVER) explained by explanatory 
variables) is 7.74%. The coefficients of the intensity of 
news announcement for all three categories, 
particularly INV_STRUC, are highly significant and 
positively correlated with Ln(SHTURNOVER).
Consistent with expectation, Ln(VOLATILITY), OWN
and Ln(TA) have significant and negative relation with 
average daily share turnover whereas LEV has a 
significant and positive relation with average daily 
share turnover. However, TobinQ and GROWTH do 
not show significant effect. Our results further suggest 
that the marginal effect of difference in years and 
industries are also significant. The finding indicates 
that firm’s reporting strategy, specifically 
INV_STRUC, can induce the average daily share 
turnover. In other words, increasing news announce-
ments in all three categories could diminish the 
information asymmetry problem.  
Lastly, we investigate the effect of each category of 
news announcement on the price volatility, another 
proxy for information asymmetry. The 2SLS 
estimation in model (7) is significant at the 1% level. 
INV_STRUC and LEG_MIS information are positively 
and significantly interrelated with Ln(VOLATILITY) at 
the 1% level, but FIN_INFO information is insigni-
ficant. The investors’ trading behaviors are highly 
sensitive to the rising of news announcement, 
especially INV_STRUC information. The possible 
explanation is that the intensity of news announcement 
perhaps encourages higher price fluctuation1. In other 
words, it is possibly that investors tend to frequently 
adjust their trading strategies and their revision of 
beliefs relative to news announcement (Mcnichols and 
Manegold, 1983). 
                                                     
1 Moreover, if all firms had identical disclosure policies, then those 
firms that had more volatile and uncertain fundamentals or more 
objectively determined reasons for disclosure may: (1) disclose more in 
response; and (2) have more volatile stocks as a result of their greater 
intrinsic uncertainty. They might also tend to have larger bid-ask 
spreads, which would imply that the estimated negative impact of 
disclosure on bid-ask spread could underestimate the true relation 
because of this unobserved heterogeneity. 
Overall, the results show that the intensity of each 
category of news announcement indirectly and 
directly explains RESPREAD, SHTURNOVER and 
VOLATILITY as proposed in hypothesis (5), (6) and 
(7), respectively. That is, a commitment to increase the 
corporate disclosure and transparency of firms 
especially the category of Investment and Structural 
Change information, as well as, Legal and 
Miscellaneous information. 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects 
of corporate announcement in two respects. First, 
this paper examines which types of firms are 
willing to disclose the news to public and which 
type of news they are likely to disclose. Second, 
the paper further explores how each type of news 
announcement influences the market trading 
movement by the mean of 2SLS estimation. This 
paper provides a number of findings. First, the 
determinants that induce firms to increase news 
announcement are the characteristics of firms such 
as firm leverage, firm performance, firm growth, 
firm size and firm’ ownership concentration. The 
high leverage firms are motivated to increase news 
announcements, especially financial information. 
The firms with high opportunity growth and 
having good performance are likely to disclose 
the Investment and Structural Changes, together 
with, Legal and Miscellaneous information than 
firms with low growth and poor performance. 
Moreover, firms with large size and having low 
ownership concentration frequently disclose the 
investment and structural change as well as Legal 
and Miscel-laneous information than firms with 
small size and having high ownership concentration.  
Second, this study analyzes whether firm’ policies 
of increasing the corporate disclosure and 
transparency can reduce information asymmetry 
among insiders and outside investors. The 
empirical results demonstrate that listed companies 
in Thailand with high corporate transparency and 
disclosure, particularly in Investment and 
Structural Change as well as Legal and 
Miscellaneous information have low relative bid-
ask spreads and high share turnover. Conclusively, 
the evidence supports the notion that increasing 
corporate disclosure and transparency can reduce 
the asymmetric information between informed and 
uninformed traders. 
Our results provide new evidences presenting not 
only that the firm characteristics influence 
corporate disclosure strategy, but also that 
information asymmetry tend to diminish associated 
with increasing firm transparency. Furthermore, 
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the findings provide insightful information to various 
market participants such as financial managers, 
investors and regulators. The findings suggest 
financial managers to plan the proper reporting 
strategy. Investors can interpret information disclosure 
and transform it to prudent investment strategy.  
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